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CAN STUDENTS BE DISCIPLINED FOR OFF-CAMPUS
CYBERSPEECH?: THE REACH OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT IN THE AGE OF TECHNOLOGY

Allan G. Osborne, ,Jr., Ed.D
Charles J. Russo, J.D., Ed.D.
1.

INTRODUCTION

The widespread use of technology in today's schools has
ushered in a host of legal issues that educators and parents
could not have contemplated just a few years ago. Within the
past decade, students have had the unprecedented ability to
send text messages and instant messages, create websites, post
blogs, construct Internet profiles, and post messages on
burgeoning social networking sites, most notably Facebook. 1
Even when students engage in such speech-related activity off
campus using their personal computers, their actions and posts
on such social networking sites as MySpace and Facebook can
have
carryover
effects
into
school
and
classroom
environments.2
The question of whether educational administrators can
discipline students for Internet postings made off campus has
been controversial, as evidenced by four recent decisions: a pair
from the Third Circuit3 and single cases from the Fourth and
Eighth Circuits. The issue in these cases, which reached
different outcomes, revolved around the reach of such postings
into the school setting and how they affected the safe and
efficient operation of the schools. Given the nature of the
1. Sec, e.l-f., Mike Swift, Facebuoh Mobile to Rull Out Brand Ads; Strategy Will
Jimture Spunsured Stories to Link Users, Companies, SAN ,JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Cal.),
Mar. 1, 2012, at 1 f) (noting that Facebook now has H50 million users). This is
incredibh· growth considering that Facd)()ok was "born" on Fdlruary 1. 20tH.
Faceb()oh:~ Timelinf'. USA']'OilAY. Feb. 12.2012, at :m.
2. For commentary on this issue, see Leora Harpaz, Internet Speech and the
First Amendment Ril-fhts uf Public Schuol Students, 2000 BYU. Elluc. & L.,J. 12:1 (2000).
:1. Martha McCarthy. qyberspeech Cuntruuersies in the Third Circuit, 25H
EllUl'. L. I{EI'. 1 (2011). Kathleen Conn, The Third Circuit l<;n Bane Decisions on Out-ofSehoul Student Speech: Analysis and Recommendations, 270 EIlLJc. L. l{~;p. :iH9 (201l).
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Internet, this is no easy question and presents school
administrators with First Amendment Issues never before
contemplated.
As these recent appellate court decisions illustrate,
educational administrators are rightfully concerned when
students post negative comments about school personnel or
peers on the Internet for all to see. Litigation has arisen when
school officials have disciplined students for derogatory,
defamatory, lewd, and threatening items students have posted
about teachers, administrators, and classmates on social
networking sites such as MySpace and Facebook. In
challenging the disciplinary sanctions imposed on them,
students have alleged that punishments, such as suspensions
or loss of privileges, amount to unconstitutional censorship and
have questioned the rights of administrators to impose
discipline for off-campus activities. 4
This Article begins by exploring the First Amendment freespeech protections afforded to students, along with earlier
cases dealing with issues concerning their being disciplined for
online postings and cyber threats. The Article next reviews the
facts, judicial history, and latest opinions in the four most
recent Circuit court cases involving online postings targeted at
both school administrators and students. Finally, the Article
examines the abilities of school administrators to discipline
students for making derogatory and false statements about
school personnel or other students via the Internet or other
technology, concluding with a discussion about the wisdom of
these
decisions
and
recommendations
for
school
administrators. It is important to recognize that the judicial
opinions, and thus the focus of this article, are concerned only
with the right of school administrators to discipline students
for off-campus postings. This Article does not venture into the
area of what other recourse educators have to protect
themselves against the possible defamatory and damaging
effects of false postings.

1.
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nESPONSIBILITIES OF TEACHlms (2011).
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BACKGROUND

In determining whether students can be disciplined for offcampus conduct involving the use of cyberspace, courts first
need to ascertain whether the social networking or cyber posts
in question are protected speech. In doing so, the judiciary
turns to a line of United States Supreme Court cases on
student speech in general. As with speech in more traditional
educational contexts, an important factor that courts examine
is whether Internet po stings caused, or had a reasonable
potential to cause, substantial disruptions in schools.5
The First Amendment includes some of the basic rights
guaranteed to all individuals in the United States. Accordingly,
it has been the focus of much litigation in education, involving
not only the rights of students, but also those of teachers.6
Even though the language of the First Amendment applies to
Congress, it has been extended to the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment.7 The First Amendment provides that "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for redress of
grievances."8

5. For a discussion of related issues, see Ronald D. WenkarL, /Jisruptive
Student Speech and the First Amendment: How /Jisruptive /Joes it Have to nc(. 2:36
ElJuc. L. 1{J;:I'. 551 (200S).
(5.
For examples of cases involving teachers' First Amendment rights, see
Pichring v. Bd. of Educ., :391 U.S. 56:3 (1968); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 129
U.S. 27,1 (1977); Givhan v. W. Line Conso!. Sch. Dist., 1il9 U.S. 110 (1979); Connick v.
~1yers, 161 U.S. 1:3S (19S:3); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 517 U.S. 110 (2006). For discussions
of these issues, see Charles .J. Russo, Social Nrtworhin/{ Sites and the Free Speech
lli/{hts of School I~mployees, 75 SCH. Bus. AFFAIHS :38 (Apr. 20(9); l{alph D. Mawdsley
& Allan G. Osborne" The Supreme Court Prouides New /Jirection for Employee Free
Speech in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 211 EDUC. L. REP. 157-165 (2007).
7. See, e.g, Cantwell v. Connecticut, :310 U.S. 29G (1910) (invalidating the
convictions of .Jehovah·s Witnesses who violated a state statute against soliciting funds
for religious. charitahle, or philanthropic purposes unless they had the prior approval
of public officials). But see Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore. :32 U.S. 7
(1 t::l:3) (holding that the Bill of Rights was inapplicable to the states since its history
r('vealed that it was limited to the federal government).
S. U.S. CONST. amend. !.
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TTl. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON STUDENTS' FREE SPEECH
RIGHTS

The Supreme Court's 1969 ruling in Tinker u. Des Moines
Community School District9 recognized and
established that students are persons under the United States
Constitution and have free speech rights protected by the First
Amendment. Even though the Court drew back on the
sweeping protections it afforded students, Tinker stands out as
the first of four Supreme Court cases in which the Justices
addressed students' free speech rights. Tinker thus set the
standard by which all courts begin their analysis III
determining whether students can be disciplined for
expressions either on or off campus. In its three subsequent
cases on student expression, Bethel School District No. 403 u.
Fraser,lO Hazelwood School District u. Kuhlmeier,ll and Morse
u. Frederick,12 the Court refined, and arguably narrowed, the
protections it established in Tinker, but left its basic holding
unaltered.

Independent

A.

Schenck u. United States

Prior to reviewing the four cases on students' free speech
rights, it may be helpful at this juncture to examine the
government's ability to limit free speech in general. The
Supreme Court has essentially fashioned two standards
addressing state-imposed limits on free speech. In Schenck u.
United States,13 a dispute involving national security during
the World War I era, the Court maintained that "[t]he most
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in
falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic."14 In so
doing, the Court enunciated the so-called "clear and present
danger" test, contending that "[t]he question ... is whether the
words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a

9.

10.
11.
12.
1il.
11.

Tinker v. Des Moincs Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., :39:3 U.S. 50:3 (1969).
Bethel Seh. Dist. No. 10:3 v. Fraser, 178 U.S. 675 (1986).
Hazelwood Sch. DiRt. v. Kuhlmeier, 181 U.S. 2()O (1988).
Morse v. Fredc'rick, 551 U.S. ::39:3 (2007).
Schcnck v. United States, 219 U.S.17 (1919).
Id. at 52.

OFF-CAMPUS CYBERSPEECH

2]

335

nature as to create a clear and present danger .... "15 Thus,
the clear and present danger test requires more than the
possibility of disruption in order for free speech to be curtailed.
Speech cannot be limited unless there is an explicit concern
that serious harm to the public welfare may follow. However,
recognizing that the clear and present danger test was not
entirely appropriate for use in schools, the Court created a
different measure for schools in Tinker by stating that
students' free speech could be curtailed only if it caused
material and substantial disruptions in schools. Before Tinker,
when students challenged school administrators' exercise of
control over disruptive expressive activity, courts typically
deferred to school administrators' judgment. For example, an
appellate court in California upheld a student's expulsion for
refusing to apologize for making critical statements about a
school facility during a speech at a school assembly.16

B.

Tinker u. Des Moines Independent Community School
District

The Supreme Court decided Tinker amid the social and
political upheaval of the 1960s. In its first case on an issue
directly related to student expression, the Court invalidated
the policy of a school board in Iowa prohibiting students from
wearing black armbands to school in protest of the United
States' involvement in Vietnam. Stating that "[i]t [couldJ
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate,"17 the Court attempted to balance the rights
of students against the recognized needs of educators to
preserve order and discipline in schools. The Court saw the
dispute as one "involv[ing] direct, primary First Amendment
rights akin to 'pure speech,"'IS rather than one "concernringJ
speech or action that intrudes upon the work of the schools or
the rights of other students."19 In order to prohibit students
from expressing particular points of view, the Court was
1:).
1G.
17.

lei.

18.

Wooster v. Sunderland, 118 1'. 959 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1915).
Tinkl'r v. D(~s Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., a9:) U.S. 50:1, 50G (19G9).
Id. at 508.

19.

Id.
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convinced that school officials must be able to show that their
actions were motivated by
something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort
and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint. Certainly where there is no finding and no
showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would
"materially and substantially interfere with the requirements
of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school," the
prohibition cannot be sustained.20

Hence, the Court declared that disciplining students for
expression violates the First Amendment unless school
authorities can show that either a material or substantial
disruption occurred or that the potential for disruption was
reasonably foreseeable. 21

C.

Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser

Seventeen years after Tinker, the Supreme Court examined
the limits of student expression in Fraser, a dispute in
Washington involving a student who delivered a lewd speech at
a school assembly nominating a friend for student council prior
to elections. 22 The speech was laced with elaborate, graphic,
and explicit sexual metaphors, but did not contain any explicit
profanity.23 Not surprisingly, the speech caused a substantial
disruption because some students in the audience responded
boisterously while others seemed embarrassed.24 The student,
who ignored warnings from two educators not to deliver the
speech, was suspended for three days for violating the school's
rule prohibiting obscene and profane language. 25
In reversing the Ninth Circuit's ruling in favor of the
student, the Supreme Court held that school officials are not
prohibited from disciplining students for offensively lewd or
20. Id. at 509 (citing Burnside v. Bym:;, :l6:1 F.2d 711. 719 (5th Cir. 19(6)).
21. For a recent commentary on Tinller and its prog(~ny, see Perry A Zirkel. The
Rachet's Red Glare: The I,argely Errant and Deflected Flight ()fTinkl~r, :m ,J.L. & EllUl'.
59:1 (2009).
22. For a representative commentary, see David Schimnll'l, Lewd Language Not
I'rotected: Bethel School District v. Fraser, 2:1 ElJuc. L. I{I.:I'. 999 (1986).
2:1. Bdhel Sch. Dist. No. 10:1 v. Fraser, 178 U.S. 675. (;78 (l9iJ6).
21. Id.
2fl. Id.

2J
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indecent speech under the First Amendment. 26 The Court
reasoned that school administrators were justified in
disciplining the student for violating school rules because he
delivered the speech after being advised not to do so.27 The
Court distinguished the speech in Fraser from that in Tinker,
where the armbands were a passive, non-disruptive expression
of a political position, rather than a lewd and obscene speech
incident to a student election lacking in political viewpoint and
delivered to an unsuspecting captive audience. 28 Recognizing
the duty of school personnel to inculcate habits and manners of
civility while teaching students the boundaries of socially
appropriate behavior, the Court insisted that "ft]he
determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in
school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school
board."29

D.

Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier

In Kuhlmeier, the Supreme Court addressed an issue
involving school officials' control over school-sponsored
publications. 8o Kuhlmeier arose in Missouri when a high school
principal deleted two articles-one on teenage pregnancy and
the other about the divorce of a student's father-from a
newspaper written and edited by students in a journalism
class.:31 The Eighth Circuit had held that the student
newspaper was a public forum for First Amendment purposes
and that school officials were not justified in censoring the
articles.:32
Acknowledging that the newspaper was not an open forum
either by policy or past practice, the Court agreed that the
principal acted reasonably in light of factors such as the
possible identification of unnamed pregnant students,

20. ld. at 685.
27. ld.
28. Fraser, 178 U.S. at 681.
29. hi. at 68:1.
:10. For a repreHentative commentary, Hee David Schimmel, Censorship of
School·Sponsored Publications: Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 15 Enuc. L. I{EI'. 911 (191-\1-\).
:11. Kuhlmeipr v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d 1:161-\ (1-\th Cir. 191-\6), rev'd, 11-\1
U.S. 260 (1988), remanded to 810 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1(88).
:12. ld. at 1:)7S.
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references to sexual activity and birth control that were
inappropriate for some of the school's younger students, and a
student's unilateral criticism of her father.33
The Court distinguished Kuhlmeier from Tinker by stating
that the issue was not so much the right of students to speak as
it was the duty of school personnel to not promote particular
student speech.34 In this respect, the Court recognized the
authority of school administrators over school-sponsored
publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive
activities that could reasonably be perceived to bear a school's
imprimatur. 35 In a split decision, the Court was satisfied that
the First Amendment is not violated when school personnel
exercise editorial control over the substance of schoolsponsored expressive activities if their actions are reasonably
related to valid educational objectives. 3n
In its analysis, the Supreme Court reviewed different
categories that it demarcated for free speech. The Court noted
that governmental power to regulate expression is most
restricted on public property such as parks, streets, and
sidewalks. According to the Court, the government may bar
speakers from traditional public fora only when necessary to
serve compelling state interests and only when doing so by the
least restrictive means available. 37 The Court added that
narrowly tailored, content-neutral regulations as to time, place,
and manner of expression can be enforced, but only if the
governmental interest is significant and alternative channels of
communication are open.3S Conceding that the public school
setting is a special context for First Amendment purposes, the
Court wrote that school personnel do not need to allow student
speech that is inconsistent with the school's basic educational
mission when that speech is sponsored by the school or is part
of its curriculum.:~9 Further, the Court made a distinction
between the forum in Fraser and situations where school

:l:l.
:)1\.

;)5.
:j6.
:37.
38.
:39.

Kuhlmeier, 181 U.S. at 271.
lei. at 271.
lei. at 281.
lei. at 260.
lei. at 2G7.
lei. at 2G7.
KuhlmeieT, ·181 U.S. at 2G6.
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facilities and media are open for use by the general public,
including student organizations. 4o

E.

Morse v. FredericJ(

In its latest student First Amendment case, the Supreme
Court further refined the free speech rights of students
attending school-supervised events. 41 Morse arose when a high
school principal suspended a student for displaying a banner
while he was watching an Olympic Torch parade near his
school in Juneau, Alaska. 42 The principal allowed students and
staff supervising the event to leave class to watch the parade
as an approved social activity.4:~ One student was disciplined
because he created, displayed, and refused to take down a large
banner which read "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS," which the
principal interpreted as advocating illegal drug use. 44 When
the student challenged his suspension, the federal trial court in
Alaska granted the school board's motion for summary
judgment, but the Ninth Circuit reversed in his favor. 45
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the decision and
rejected the student's claim that he was not engaged in school
speech, noting that the event was sufficiently associated with
the school. 46 In finding that the principal's inlerpretation that
the banner could be perceived as promoting illegal drug use
was reasonable, the Court relied on Tinker, Fraser, and
Kuhlmeier in conducting a two-part analysis. 47 First, the Court
observed that students' free speech rights must be viewed in
light of the "special characteristics" existing in a school
environment.48 Next, the Court ruled that Tinker is neither
absolute nor the only basis on which student speech can be
Id. at 267.
Morse v. Fred(,rick, 551 U.S. :19:3 (2007).
Id.
Id.
1,1. Id.
1:1. Id.
1(;. Id. at 108. For rqJfl,sl,ntative commentary on Morse, sec Charks .1. Russo,
Supreme Court Update: The Free Speech Rilfhts of Students in the United States Post
Morst' v. Frederick, 19 ETllJc. & L. 215 (2007): .John Dayton & Ann Proffitt Duprt',
Morse Code: How School Speech Tahes a ("Hon!J'J Hit, 2:3:3 ElllJc. L. REP. 50:3 (2008).
17. Morse,SS1 U.S. at 108.
1H. Id.
10.
1.
12.
1:3.
~
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restricted.49
Noting that its own Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
understood the important, and perhaps even compelling,
interest of educators to deter student drug use, the Supreme
Court ascertained that the principal acted properly in
disciplining the student for displaying the bannerJio However,
the Court did reject the school board's argument that the
principal could have banned the banner under Fraser's "plainly
offensive" standard, reasoning that doing so would grant school
officials too much authority.51 The Court instead decided that
the principal acted out of the school's legitimate concern of
preventing the student from promoting illegal drug use. 52

IV. EARLY DECISIONS REGARDING STUDENT CYDERSPEECH
With technology playing an increasingly larger role in both
schools and the lives of students, it was inevitable that
litigation involving cyberspeech would arise. As often occurs
when new issues arise, court decisions produce different
outcomes depending on the particular facts of the various
cases. As can be expected, students have frequently challenged
disciplinary sanctions for their cyberspeech on First
Amendment grounds. 53

A.

Discipline Upheld When Cyberspeech Creates Disruptions

In an early case dealing directly with the issue of student
cyberspeech directed toward school personnel, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania upheld the expulsion of a student who
posted negative comments about teachers and suggested that
the principal had engaged in sex with another administrator. 54
The record revealed that the student went so far as to solicit
funds to help pay for a hit man after listing reasons why a

ld. at 105.
ld. at 107, 109-10.
ld. at 108.
52. ld. at 110.
53. For a representative commentary, see Duffy B. Trager, New '1hclis for Old
f)or;": The Tinker Standard Applied to Cyber-Bullyinr;, a8 ,J.I,. & Elluc. 55:3 (2009).
51. ,J.S. ex rei. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 757 A,2d 112 (I'a. Commw. Ct.
20(0).
19.

50.
51.
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named teacher should die. 55 While the court recognized that
the student's comments were sophomoric and never constituted
a real threat, it supported the school board's decision since the
postings resulted in an actual disruption of the educational
process. 56 The teacher who was the target of the solicitations to
hire the hit man was so distraught by the threats made in the
postings that she took a medical leave of absence because she
suffered severe anxiety after viewing the website. 57 Substitute
teachers were hired to replace the teacher during the duration
of her leave, causing a disruption of the educational process for
her students.58
In two separate decisions, the Second Circuit held that
school administrators could discipline students for Internet
postings that caused, or had the potential to cause, disruptions
in their respective schools. 59 In the first case, the court
affirmed the long-term suspension of a middle-school student
from New York who created a drawing and text on the Internet
suggesting that a named teacher should be shot and killed.60
Even though a criminal investigation and a psychological
evaluation of the student indicated that his actions never posed
a real threat, school officials suspended him after a hearing
officer found that his postings disrupted the school
environment.61 The court was convinced that the student's
po stings constituted a threat that crossed the boundary of
acceptable free speech and therefore was not protected. 62
In the second case, the Second Circuit upheld the
Connecticut federal trial court's denial of a student's request
for a preliminary injunction to void disciplinary action taken
against her for posting a vulgar message on her website urging
others to contact the Superintendent of Schools to protest her

5Ei.
56.
57.

Id.
lei.
lei.
lei.

at116.
at ,125.
at ,120.
()H.
at ,117.
59. Wisnil'wski v. Bd. of Educ. of Wm,dsport Cl'nt. Sch. DisL.. ,191 F.ad :11 (2d
Cir. 2007); i)oningpr V. Nil'hoff. 527 F.:ld ,11 (2d Cir. 200tl). cert. denied. 2011 WL
:120,ltl5:1 (Oct. :n. 2011).
60. Wisnicwshi. ,19,1 F.:ld at :11.
61. Jd. at :l6-:l7.
62. Jd. at ;IH-;l~).
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cancellation of a school activity.6:~ The student's purpose in
posting the comments was to anger the Superintendent. 64 The
court ruled that the student failed to show a likelihood of
success on the merits inasmuch as her conduct "created a
foreseeable risk of substantial disruption to the work and
discipline of the school."65 Although the student's request for
an injunction was since mooted by her graduation, she again
filed suit seeking damages. 66 The trial court subsequently
denied her motion for summary judgment, concluding that her
First Amendment rights were not violated when she was
prohibited from running for class office because her off-campus
posting was clearly intended to come on to campus and
influence other students.67 In the alternative, the court
determined, and the Second Circuit affirmed, that insofar as
any First Amendment rights that the student claimed were not
clearly established at the time of the alleged violation, the
school officials were entitled to qualified immunity.G8 The court
saw no need to reach the question of whether the student's
First Amendment rights had actually been violated when
school officials prohibited her from running for class office.
A federal trial court in Tennessee upheld the suspension of
students who created fake profiles of school personnel
suggesting that the targeted individuals engaged in
inappropriate behavior with students.69 The court stated that
the profiles were not parodies protected under the First
Amendment inasmuch as visitors to the web sites could believe
that the profiles were authentic. 7o
In an interesting case illustrative of the importance of
having explicit policies in place to regulate student conduct, a
federal trial court in Ohio agreed that school officials did not
violate a student's First Amendment rights by suspending him

6:1. f)oninger, 527 F.:ld at 11.
61. Id. at 45,
65, Id. at 5:1,
66. Doninger v. Niehoff, 591 F. Supp. 2d 211 (D. Conn. 20(9), (j12 F.:ld :l:H (2<1
Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 2011 WL :320185:1 (Oct. :11,2(11).
67. Id. at 221.
68. Id. at 221.
69. Barnett v. Tipton Cnty. Bd. of Edne., 601 F. Snpp. 2d 980 (W.D. Tenn. 20(9).
70. lei. at 9il1.
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for accessing an unauthorized website on school computers.71
The student created the website, which contained pictures of
classmates labeled as losers with lewd captions, on his home
computer, but then accessed the site in the school's computer
lab.72 The student was suspended for violating the school's
code, which prohibited accessmg such sites on school
computers. 7:3

B.

Discipline Not Upheld Absent Disruptions

School authorities have not succeeded in disciplining
students for Internet postings when they have failed to show
that the offensive material caused a disruption to the
educational process. In an illustrative Missouri case, a federal
trial court ruled for a student who posted vulgar and insulting
comments critical of the school, its administration, and its
teachers.74 Finding no evidence of actual or potential
disruption to the school, the court remarked that the fact that
school officials disliked or were upset by the content of the
posting was insufficient grounds for limiting the student's
speech by suspending him for ten days.75 In another case, a
principal suspended a student for violating school rules
regarding cyberbullying and harassment of a staff member
after the student created a group on Facebook and encouraged
her peers to express dislike of a named teacher.76 A federal
trial court in Florida asserted that the posting fell within the
umbrella of protected speech, observing that it expressed an
opinion about a teacher, but did not cause a disruption and was
not lewd, vulgar, or threatening. 77
For the most part, courts have not upheld disciplinary
actions when educational officials are unable to show that
student cyberspeech--aeated off campus on home computers

71. Coy v. Bd. of Educ. of N. Canton City Schs.,
2(02).
72.
7:1.

7(j.

Supp. 2d 791

(N.D.

Ohio

Id.
Id.

7,1. Beussink ex rei.
(E.D. Mo. 199H).
75. Id. at 11 HO.
77.

205 F.

Beussink v. Woodland

Evans v. Bayer. 681
1:171.

Id. at

F.

Supp.

2d

1{-IV

Sch. Dist.,

1365. 1:1G7 (S.D.

:lO F.

Fla. 2010).

Supp.

2<1

1175
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or personal devices-reached into school settings to cause
material and substantial disruptions. In this regard, a federal
trial court in Michigan found that a student's suspension for
contributing objectionable material to a website violated his
First Amendment free speech rights in the absence of evidence
that his postings either caused a disruption in the school or
were created using a school computer.78 Similarly, a federal
trial court in Pennsylvania held that school officials exceeded
their authority by disciplining a student who had sent e-mails
from his home computer ridiculing the athletic director. 79 Even
though the e-mails were lewd and vulgar, given the fact that
they were not created in school, the court reasoned that
administrators could not suspend the student in the absence of
evidence that it caused a disruption. 8o
Another case from Pennsylvania further highlights the
importance of having specific policies to guide administrators
in disciplining students for engaging in any form of expression.
A student who had been disciplined for taking part in an online
conversation challenged various aspects of the student
handbook as being unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. 81
In ruling for the student, the federal trial court stated that
terms such
as "abuse," "offend," "harassment," and
"inappropriate" were vague in that they were not further
defined.82 In addition, the court insisted that the school's
policies were vague in their application and interpretation,
which could lead to arbitrary enforcement.i,:l The court also
agreed with the student's contention that the student

7S. Mahaffey v. Aldrick, 2:lG F. Supp. 2d 779 (KD. Mich. 2(02). See a/so .J.C. ex
v. Beverly Hills Unifil,d Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 112:5-2G (S.D. Cal.
2(10) (ruling that school officials lacked the authority to 8lIspend a stmk,nt who had
postl,d a video clip on YouTuhe since it was cn,ated off campus and did not fl'sult in a
substantial disruption to the schooll,nvironmlmt).
79. Killion v. Franklin /{eg'l Sch. Dist., 1:lG F. Supp. 2d 11G (W.D. Pa. 2(01).
SO. lei. at 151. See also Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 115, 92 F. Bupp. 2d lOSS
(W.D. Pa. 2(00) (granting a temporary restraining order to prevent suspension of a
studl,nt for speech that was created l'ntirely outside of the school's supervision and
control, l'ven though the intended audience was connectl,d to the school).
SI. Flaherty v. Keystol1l' Oaks Seh. Dist., 217 F. Supp. 2d ti9S (W.D. Pa. 200:l).
82. Iii. at 70G. See also Killion , l:lG F. Supp. 2d at 11G (ruling that school
district's policies against abuse of teachers and administrators was unconstitutionally
overbroad and vague).
8:i. Killion. 1:lti F. Supp. 2d at 11ti.
rei. Re.
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handbook was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague to the
extent that it failed to geographically limit school officials'
authority to discipline expression that occurred on school
property or at school functions. R4
Courts have closely examined situations where student
speech, whether spoken verbally85 or electronically through
cyberspeech,86 has been critical of school officials' actions or
school boards' policies when those criticisms have been
expressed in vulgar terms. For example, the Supreme Court of
Indiana invalidated a student's delinquency adjudication for
posting vulgar remarks about her school's rules banning body
piercings, holding that the student engaged in protected speech
that criticized a governmental action and that there was
insufficient evidence of any intent to harass, annoy, or alarm
her middle-school principal. 87

V.

RECENT CIRCUIT COURT CASES ON STUDENT CYDERSPEECH

As the above discussion indicates, courts have issued
seemingly conflicting opmlOns on school administrators'
abilities to control cyberspeech, especially when that speech
originated off campus. In these decisions, courts have
attempted to balance students' First Amendments rights with
administrators' obligations to maintain safe, orderly schools.
Even so, the result has left school officials with little guidance
regarding the extent to which they can regulate student speech
created using today's technology. Recently, three circuits issued
four decisions that have shed new light on the controversy.
Although three of these four decisions were appealed to the
Supreme Court, the Justices denied certiorari m all

81. ld.
tl5. Poling v. Murphy, tln F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1989), cat. denied, 1ml u.s. 1021
(1990) (affirming that officials in Tennessee could discipline a candidat.e for the,
position of prl'sident of the studl'nt council for making a speech at an election assembly
that. was disrespectful of school authorities since it included discourte,olls and rude
n·marks).
tl6. See, e.g., Doninge,r v. Niehoff, 527 F.ild 11 (2d Cir. 200tl), cat. denied, 1:32 S.
Ct. ,199 (2011) (affirming that educational officials could prohibit a stlldcmt from
running for class office be,callse of vulgar comments that she made about
administrat.ors on Iwr blDg).
87. AB. v. State of Indiana, tl85 N.K2d 122:l (Ind. 2(08).
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instances. s8

A.

Third Circuit: Layshock v. Hermitage School District

The dispute in Layshock v. Hermitage School DistrictH9
began when a high school student created a false, unflattering
profile of his school principal on a social networking site. 9o The
student created the profile using his grandmother's home
computer during non-school hours.91 In creating the profile, the
student used a picture of the principal that he copied from the
school's website. 92 The student gave access to the profile to
several of his classmates, and soon much of the student body
became aware of the profile. 9;3 At one point, the student also
accessed the profile on a school computer and showed it to some
of his classmates. 94 Following an investigation, school officials
suspended the student for ten days, placed him in an
alternative curriculum program, banned him from attendance
and participation in extracurricular activities, and barred him
from participating in his high school graduation ceremony.95
The student and his parents filed suit seeking, inter alia, a
temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction to
prevent imposition of the penalties. 96 In their suit, the
plaintiffs alleged that the disciplinary actions imposed by the
school officials violated the student's rights under the First
Amendment.97

8H. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v .•J.S. ex rei. Snyder. 1:32 S. Ct. 1097 (2012)
(denying certiorari for Snyder and Layshoch v. Hermitage School f)istrict); Kowalski v.
Berkeley Cnty. Schs., l:l2 S. Ct. 1095 (2012).
H9. Layshock v. Ihmnitage Sch. Dist., 1\96 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Pa. 20(7), rehi;
en bane gmnted and opinion vacated, 59:l V:ld 21\ 9 (:ld Cir. 201 0), afrd, 650 F.:ld 206
(:ld Cir. 2(11), ccrt. denied sub nom. Snyder, l:l2 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
90. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., ,112 F. Supp. 2d 502, 501\ (w.n. I'a. 20(6)
(denying plaintiffs' motion for temporary restraining order). For a commentary of such
profIles, see Kevin 1'. Brady, Student-Created Fake Online Profiles Using Social
Networhing Websiles: Protected Online Speech Parodies or /Jefamution, 21\1\ Elluc. L.
REP. 907 (2009).
91. Luyshock, 1\ 12 F. Supp. 2d at. 502.
92. ld. at 505.
9:1. Id.
91\. Id.
96. ld.
96. ld. at 506-06.
97. l_ayshock, 1\ 12 F. Supp. 2d at 505-06.
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]. Initial Trial Court Decision: Denial of Injunctive Relief
Following a hearing on the motion for a preliminary
injunction, a federal trial court in Pennsylvania agreed that the
educators were justified in disciplining the student.98 In
denying the student's request for a temporary restraining
order, the court was satisfied that school authorities had
presented sufficient evidence that the posting created a
material and substantial disruption of the schoo1.99
Specifically, the record revealed that students accessed the
website so frequently on school computers that officials had to
shut down the school's computer system for several days,
causing the cancellation of some computer classes and limiting
student use of computers for school assignments. IOO Further,
the school's technology coordinator was required to devote
considerable time to dealing with the situation and installing
additional firewall protections) 01 The court also did not find
that the student would suffer irreparable harm if it did not
intervene in his behalf.102

2. Trial Court Decision on the Merits
Following a trial with a more fully developed record, the
court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on
their First Amendment claims. 103 The court acknowledged the
difficulty in establishing the school's boundaries for First
Amendment purposes.10 4 The court observed that the "mere
fact that the Internet may be accessed at school" does not give
school officials the authority to discipline students for off9S. ld. at fiOS-09.
99. ld.
100. ld. at 507 -OS. For cases when, students were disciplined for "hacking" into
tlw computer systems of their sehools, see Harris ex rei. Harris v. Pontotoc Cnty. Sch.
Dist., 6:15 F.:1d 6S5 (5th Cir. 2011); M.T. v. Cent. York Seh. Dist., 9:n A2d 5:3S (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2(07). appmi denied, 951 A2d 1168 (Pa. 200S).
101. Layshoch, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 50S.
102. ld.
10:1. Layshoek ex rei. Layshock v. Hermitage Seh. Dist., 196 F. Supp. 2d 587
(W.D. Pa. 2007). The court also grant.ed the school hoard's motion for summary
judgment on thl' plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment due process claims. However, since
the plaintiffs did not appeal this decision during the rehearing, it is beyond the scope of
this commentary.
101. ld. at fi9fi-96.
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campus actions such as occurred in this case. I05 Thus, relying
on the Supreme Court's student speech decisions, the trial
court held that, in order to discipline students for off-campus
speech, school administrators need to show a connection
between the speech and the material and substantial
disruption, either actual or potential, of the educational
setting. 106 However, the court made it clear that any assertions
of potential disruption on the part of school personnel must be
well-founded.107
After reviewing the record and hearing further testimony,
the court changed its position regarding the school
administrators' claims that the student's actions created a
substantial disruption to the educational process. !Os This time
around, the court determined that the disruption was not so
substantial as to warrant curtailment of the student's free
speech rights. I09 The court found that even in the light most
favorable to the school officials, the plaintiffs failed to establish
a sufficient causal nexus between the student's off-campus
actions and any disruption to the school.ll0 Specifically, the
court pointed to the fact that other false profiles of the
principal had been created during the same time period, and it
was not clear that this student's profile was the one responsible
for the alleged disruption. III Further, the court noted that the
actual disruption was minimal in that no classes had been
cancelled and no widespread disorder occurred.112

597.

105.

lei. at

106.

lei. at 599-600.

lei. at 597.
lri. at GOO.
109. l,ayshoch. !J9G F. Supp. 2d at GOO.
110. lel.
111. ld. Although three other false profiles of the principal had bl'en created, none
of those students was disciplined, presumahly because school officials never learnl'd the
identities of their creators.
112. ld. In the trial court's initial decision it stated that the school's shut-down of
the computer system "caused the cancellation of several classes and interferl,d wi th
students' ability to use the computers for their school-intended purposes." Layshock v.
Hermitage Sch. Dist., !J 12 F. Supp. 2d 502, 508 (W.D. Pa. 200G). In the Third Circuit's
review of the facts, it sLates that "lcJomputer programming classes wen' also
cancelled." Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., G50 F.:ld 205, 209 (:ld Cir. 2(11). The
reason for the discrepancy hetween these statements and the court's finding here that
no dasst's wen' cancelled is unclear.
107.
108.
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3. Third Circuit Decisions113

Upon further review, a panel of the Third Circuit affirmed
that the suspension violated the student's free speech rights,
since his posting did not result in a foreseeable or substantial
disruption of the school.lI4 The court later vacated that
decision and granted a rehearing en banc in light of a
seemingly contrary decision issued by another panel of the
Third Circuit, discussed later in this commentary.ll5 Following
the rehearing, the full Third Circuit unanimously affirmed the
trial court's ruling. llG
In its appeal, the school board did not challenge the trial
court's finding that a substantial disruption of the school
environment had not occurred.117 Rather, the board claimed
that it had the authority to discipline the student because he
"entered" school property by accessing the school's website and
copying a picture of the principal to use in his false profile, his
speech was aimed at the school community, and it was
reasonable to assume that the profile would come to the
attention of school authorities.118 The court, however, was not
persuaded by the board's arguments.
The court stated that because the school board conceded
that the false profile did not cause a disruption, under the First
Amendment, school officials could not stretch their authority
into the home of the student's grandmother and reach him
"while he [was] sitting at her computer after school in order to
punish him for the expressive conduct that he engaged in
there."119 The court recognized that in today's world, "Tinker's
'schoolhouse gate' is not constructed solely of the bricks and
mortar surrounding the school yard."120 To this end, the court
posited that "[i]t would be an unseemly and dangerous
precedent to allow ... school authorities[] to reach into a child's
11 :1.
opinion is
1 H.
115.
116.
117.
11 H.
119.
120.

Since the Third Circuit's two decisions are almost identical. only the en bane
reviewed hpr".
Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 59:3 F.:1d 219,26:1 (:ld Cir. 2(10).
Id.
Layshoch. 650 F.:1d at 205.
Id. al2H.
lei.
Id.at216.
Id.
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home and control his/her actions there to the same extent that
it can control that child when he/she participates in school
sponsored activities."121 The court did not find that the
student's use of the school website to appropriate a picture of
the principal amounted to entering the school.122 The court
also rejected the notion that the profile was aimed at the school
community and would come to the attention of school personnel
as the school board claimed.123 Thus, the court affirmed the
trial court's ruling that the school's response to the student's
expressive actions violated his First Amendment guarantee of
free expression. 124
Much of the school board's appeal rested on its allegations
that the student's speech was vulgar, lewd, and offensive and
therefore unprotected under Fraser. 125 Again, the court
rebuffed the board's argument under the circumstances of this
case. 126 The court noted that school authorities may punish
students for expressive conduct that occurs outside of school
only under very limited circumstances, such as when it causes
or has the potential to cause a disruption at schoo1.127 Since the
board conceded that no disruption occurred within the school,
the court ruled that school authorities were not empowered to
discipline the student for his off-campus expressions. 128

B.

Third Circuit: J.s. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School
District

A second dispute, J.s. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain
School District,129 arose in Pennsylvania when an eighth-grade
honor-roll student created a false profile of her middle-school

121. Id.
122. Layshocl/, G50 F.:ld at 219.
12:1. Id. at 216.
121. ldat219.
125. Id. at 21 G.
126. ld.at216-17.
127. Id. at 217.
12S. Layshoch, GiJO F.:)d at 219.
129 . •J.S. ex reI. Snyder v. Bhw Mountain S~h. Dist., 200S WL 1279517 (M.D. I'a.
Sept. 11, 200S), reh{; en bane !franted and opinion uacated, 59:) F.:)d 2SG (:)d Cir. 2(10),
a!rd in part and reu'd in part, G50 F.:ld 915 (:3d Cir. 2(11), cert. denied, 1:12 S. Ct. lO97
(2()12).
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principal and posted it on MySpace. I :30 The false profile, which
the student created at home on her parents' computer, did not
identify the principal by name but incorporated his official
school-website photograph.!31 The profile also contained
sexually explicit content and vulgar languageY32 Since the
school system's computers blocked access to MySpace, no
students were able to look at the false profile at school but
could access it at home. l :):) After finding out that some of her
classmates had viewed the profile, the student made it private
so that access was limited to the twenty-two individuals listed
as her friends on the social networking site.! :34 Still, the
principal suspended the student and a classmate who assisted
her in creating the profile for ten school days.I:35 The student
wrote a letter of apology to the principal, but her parents
subsequently filed suit seeking to have the suspenSIOn
overturned .1:36

1. Trial Court Decision
At the trial, school officials claimed that the false profile
disrupted school since students discussed it in class and that
the job responsibilities of two school counselors were disrupted
because one needed to sit in on disciplinary meetings with the
students' parents while another counselor covered the other's
scheduled duties. l :37 In unpublished opinions, a federal trial
court found that the school officials' actions were justified
inasmuch as they had established a connection between the
student's off-campus action and its effect on the school.l:3R The
court pointed out that the website was about the school's
principal, the intended audience consisted of other students,
1:m. Sn'yd~r. 650 F.:1d at 920.
1:11. ld. at 920.
I :32. Among other things. the profile dl,picted the principal as a Sl'X addict and a
jwdophill' who "hit on" parents and other students. The profile also included insulting
comnwnts about the principal's wife (who also worked at the school) and child. ld.
I :l:l. ld. at ~J21.
1 :J.1. lel.
1 :15. ld. at 922.
1:)(). Snyder, ()50 F.:3d at 922.
1:37 . •J.S. ex rei. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 200H WI. 1279517 (M.D. ['a.
Sept. 11. 200H).
1:lH. ld.
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the website was discussed at school, the student created the
profile out of anger toward the principal for disciplining her in
the past, and there was some disruption during school
hours. 1:39 Further, the court held that although a substantial
disruption had not occurred, the discipline was permissible
because the false profile was vulgar and offensive and had an
effect on the school.140

2. Third Circuit Decisions
A three-judge panel of the Third Circuit initially
acknowledged that the disruption caused by J.S.'s actions was
not substantial.141 Nevertheless, a majority affirmed the lower
court's ruling that her suspension did not violate her free
speech rights because the profile's potential to cause disruption
was reasonably foreseeable. 142 Further, the court noted that
the profile was not created to criticize, but rather to humiliate
the principal.l 4:i To the extent that it might cause suspicions
about him in the community, the court stated that it could
undermine his authority.1 44 However, a dissenting judge
argued that since the speech took place out of school during
non-school hours and the disruption was not substantial, under
Tinker, the suspension violated the student's free speech
rights. 145 Given the apparent inconsistency between this ruling
and the panel's first opinion in Layshock, an en banc panel of
the Third Circuit vacated both decisions and granted
rehearings. 146
In an eight-to-six decision, the en banc court reversed and
remanded the finding that the student's suspension for offcampus speech did not violate the First Amendment. 147 The
court began by acknowledging that courts struggle to strike a
balance between safeguarding students' rights and protecting

1:\9.
HO.
H 1.
112.
11:l.
111.
H5.
146.

117.

Id.
ld.
.J.S. ex reI. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 59:\ F.:\d 286 (:kl eir. 2010).
Id.
Id. at :316.
ld. at :117.
Id. (Chagares, Circuit .Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
ld. at 286; Layshock v. Hcrmitag(~ S[:h. Dist., 59:1 F.:Jd 249 Old Cir. 2010).
.J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 6,,0 F.:ld 915 (:ld Cir. 2(11).
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school officials' authority to maintain an appropriate learning
environment.148 Even so, the court emphasized that Tinker
sets a standard that is subject to narrow exceptions. 149 One of
those exceptions, as set out in Fraser, is to regulate lewd,
vulgar, indecent, and plainly offensive speech in school.1s0
The court maintained that the student's false profile of her
principal did not cause a substantial disruption in the school
and that there was no indication that substantial disruption
was foreseeable. IS] Concerning a forecast of disruption, the
court observed that under Tinker, an "undifferentiated fear or
apprehension of disturbance [was] not enough to overcome the
right to freedom of expression."152 Further, the court was of the
opinion that the profile was "so outrageous that no one could
have taken it seriously" such that "it was clearly not
reasonably foreseeable that J.S.'s speech would create a
substantial disruption or material interference in school."lfi:'l
Next, the court simply stated that Fraser does not apply to offcampus speech and could not be used to give school officials the
authority to punish a student's out-of-school conduct. 154
Commenting that students' free speech rights outside of school
are similar to those of adults, the court thus ruled that Fraser's
standard could not he used to justify the school's discipline for
the student's use of profanity outside of school during nonschool hours. 15fi

3. Dissent
In a dissent, Judge Fisher, who wrote the majority opinion
in the Third Circuit's initial decision, criticized the court's
judgment hecause it allowed "a student to target a school
official and his family with malicious and unfounded
accusations ahout their character in vulgar, obscene, and

1'1il. ld. at. ~l2G.
l1B. hi. at. B27.
150. hI.
151. ld. at B2il.
1 fi2. Snyder. G50 F.:ld at B2B (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. DisL..
:IB:l U.S. GO:l. 50il (1 B6B)) (quot.ation markH omitted).
15:1. ld. at 9:lO.
151. ld. at 9:12.
liiG. lei.
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personal language."156 The dissent contended that in posting
the false profile online, the student not only caused
psychological harm to the principal and his family, but also
undermined his authority.157 In contrast to the majority, the
dissent was satisfied that the profile had the potential to cause
disruption that was reasonably foreseeable. 15R In allowing the
student's speech to go unpunished, the dissent insisted that the
speech could disrupt the educational process by interfering
with the operations of classrooms and the principal's ability to
perform his duties. 159 Further, the dissent maintained that if
the student's deeds went unpunished, the court would be
sending a message to the student body and others that this
form of speech was acceptable behavior.160
Responding to the student's claim that the profile was
intended as a joke, the dissent insisted that school officials did
not have to treat it as such. In this respect, the dissent
remarked that the sexual nature of the profile and its
accusations of sexual misconduct on the part of the principal
were not matters that should be taken lightly by school
personnel or the courts.IGl
C.

Fourth Circuit: Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools

Unlike the two Third Circuit cases reviewed above, the
underlying incident in Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools IG2
involved harassment of a student rather than a school
administrator.1G:3 The dispute began when a high school senior
using her home computer created a discussion group on
MySpace dedicated to ridiculing one of her classmates and
invited approximately 100 individuals to join the group.IG4
Other students, some using school computers, posted comments
and pictures on the discussion group stating that the targeted

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
168.
161.

Id. at 911 (Fisher, Circuit .Justice, dissenting).
Id.
Snyder, 650 F.ild at 915.
Id.
Id.
Id.at918.
Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sehs., 652 V.:ld 565 (1th Cir. 2(11).
ld. at 567.
ld.
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student had herpes.l 65 Although the student did not post sllch
comments herself, she did react positively to the other
postings.1 66 The targeted student's parents filed a harassment
complaint with the school's vice principal after they found out
about the MySpace postings.1 67 After determining that the
student had created a "hate website" in violation of the school's
policy against harassment and bullying, school administrators
suspended her for ten days and issued further sanctions
prohibiting her from attending specified school events for
ninety days.16S Officials reduced the suspension to five days in
response to an appeal filed by the student's father.169

1. Trial Court Decision
Even though her suspension had been reduced, the
student's father filed suit claiming that the disciplinary action
violated her free speech rights. 170 In an unpublished order, a
federal trial court in West Virginia granted summary judgment
for the school board, finding that Kowalski's web page was
created to invite others to engage in disruptive and hateful
conduct that caused a school disruption. 171 The court concluded
that school officials were justified in taking disciplinary action
for the student's vulgar and offensive speech, as well as her
invitation for others to follow her lead.172

2. Fourth Circuit Decision
On appeal, the school board argued that the student's web
page singled out a classmate for "harassment, bullying, and
intimidation" and "that it was foreseeable that the off-campus
conduct would reach the school," thereby creating a substantial
disruption. 17:3 The Fourth Circuit agreed, commenting that
school administrators need to prevent and punish harassment
165.
166.
1G7.
1Gil.
169.
170.
171.
172.

17:3.

Id.
Id.
lei. at 56il.
Kowalshi. 652 F.:ld at 5G9 (quotation marks omiUced).
lei.
lei. at 569-570.
lei. at 56G.
Id. at 570.
lei. at 571.
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and bullying to provide a safe school environment.174 Further,
the court emphasized that schools were not required to tolerate
such conduct, particularly as they attempt to educate students
about the habits and manners of civility and the fundamental
values necessary to maintain a democratic political system. 175
In terms of the web page's reach into the school, the court
ascertained that the student knew that it would go beyond her
home to impact the school environment. In this respect, the
Fourth Circuit observed that "a court could determine that
speech originating outside of the schoolhouse gate but directed
at persons in school and received by and acted on by them was
in fact in-school speech."176 In such an instance, the regulation
of that speech would be permissible under both Tinker and
Fraser. Thus, the court concluded that even though the student
was not physically present in the school when she created the
web page, it was foreseeable that her conduct would reach the
school because it was sent to students and those who
participated were mostly students.l77 Accordingly, in the final
analysis, the court ruled that since the speech had a sufficient
nexus with the school, the school administrators' actions did
not violate the Constitution. 178

D.

Eighth Circuit: D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Public
School District #60

At issue in D.J.M. ex reI. D.M. v. Hannibal Public School
District #60179 were the disciplinary measures meted out to a
high school student who had threatened harm to other
171. See also In re Kel~lin B.. 27 A.:ld :l89 (N.H. 201 1) (affirming thai l~ducational
offlcials could suspend a student for sending e-mails including sexually (,xplicit
languagl' to a principal and teacher undpr thl' naml~ of a pepr and that thp thirty-fimrday exclusion was excessive).
175. Kowalski. (j52 F.:ld at 57:3.
17(j. fd.
177. Id.at571.
178. The court also [wId that officials did not violate the student's dm, proCl'SS
rights because her lnternet-basl~d bullying and harassment of another studpnt could be
l'xpl'l:ted to interfere with the rights of that studlmt and thus disrupt. thl' school
environment. Therpforl', the court was satisfied that she was on notice that
administrators could rL'gulate and punish hpr conduct.
179. Mardis v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist., (j81 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (E-D. Mo. 2(10).
aff'd sub nom. ILJ.M. ex rei. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. #(jO. (j17 F.:3d 751 (8th
Cir. 2(10).

2J

OFF-CAMPUS CYDERSPEECH

students in an online conversation with a friend.l8o A student
and a classmate exchanged instant messages in which the
student talked about getting a gun and shooting other students
at the school.1Rl The student was placed in juvenile detention,
suspended, and expelled after the classmate contacted a
trusted adult and the police and school officials were notified of
the threats.182 The student challenged the disciplinary action,
claiming that it violated his free speech rights.1 83

1. Trial Court Decision
A federal trial court in Missouri granted the school board's
motion for summary judgment on the basis that the student's
speech constituted an unprotected true threat. 184 In the
alternative, the court found that school officials could discipline
the student due to the disruptive impact his behavior had on
the schoo1.185 The court added that the principal had testified
that campus security had been increased in response to the
threats, and considerable time was taken up addressing
concerns of students and parents. 186

2. Eighth Circuit Decision
Upon further review, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower
court decision in favor of the school board.187 As an initial
matter, the court, citing its own precedent,188 reiterated that a
true threat is a "statement that a reasonable recipient would
HIO. For n,presentative commentary dealing with student thn,ats. see Diane
Heckman, .Just Kidding: K-12 Students, Threats and First Amendment Freedom of
Speech, 259 Elluc:. L. REI'. :i81 (2010); Thomas E. Wheeler, I~essons from IAJrd of the
Flies: The Responsibility of Schools to I'rotect Students from Internet Threats and
(~vber-Hate Speech, 21 G EIlUC. L. REI'. :181, 227 (2007); Richard V. B1yst.one, School
Speech v. School Safety: In the Aftermath of Violence on School Campuses Throughout
This Nation. How Should School Officials Respond to Threatening Student
I~xpression(, 2007 BYU. EllUl'. & L .•J. 199 (2007).
181. Mardis, GH1 F. Supp. 2rl 1111.
182. Id.
11:l:l. Id.
1 H1. lri. at 1119.
H'5. lri. at 112:1-1121.
18(i Id.
IH7. D.J.M. ex rei. D.M. v. Hanniball'ub. 8ch. Dist. #60,6·17 F.:irl 75:1, 762 (8t.h
Cir. 2(11).
188. Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist. :106 F.:lrl 616 (Hth Cir. 20(7).
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have interpreted as a serious expression of an intent to harm or
cause injury."lR9 The court added that the speaker must have
intended to communicate the statement to another or a third
party.190 Since the student communicated his threats to a third
party, admitted that he was depressed, stated that he had
access to weapons, and indicated that he wanted his school to
be known for something, the court had little difficulty deciding
that his speech was a true threat.191 Since true threats are not
protected under the First Amendment, and, in view of the fact
that school boards have an obligation to protect their students,
the court affirmed that the school officials' actions did not
violate the student's rights. 192
Next, the court examined the issue of whether the student's
threats caused a substantial disruption in the schoo1.19:1 Insofar
as school personnel spent considerable time addressing student
and parent concerns about safety and increased security at the
school, the court was satisfied that a substantial disruption
occurred.194 Further, the court observed that it was reasonably
foreseeable that the student's threats would have been brought
to the attention of school authorities and created a risk of
disruption to the school setting. 19fi The court made it clear that
school personnel did not need to wait to see whether the
student's threats would be carried out before taking action. 196

VI. DISCUSSION
The Supreme Court has clearly recognized that school
settings provide a special context for the First Amendment
when dealing with student rights. 197 While it concedes that
students are persons who are entitled to First Amendment free
IH9. IJ..J.M .• 617 F.:ld at 7(j2 (quoting I)oe. :106 F.:ld at (21) (quotation marks
omitted).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 761.
192. Id.
19:1. Id. at 765.
191. Id.
195. IJ..J.M., 617 F.:ld at 766.
196. Id. at 761.
197. See Bd. of Educ. of lndep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 5:36 U.S. 822, 827 (2002)
(upholding suspicionless drug testing of student athl(~tes, noting that special 11l,,~ds
exist in the, public school context, giving officials greater authority over students).
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speech rights under the Constitution, the Court also is well
aware that school authorities must be given latitude in
maintaining safe and orderly learning environments free from
disruptions that will have a negative impact on their
educational mission. Thus, in the past, the Court has sought to
strike a proper balance between allowing non-disruptive
student expression and limiting that which can substantially
interfere with the operation of the schools. In this respect, the
Court has created a test which allows school officials to curtail
student speech when it causes material and substantial
disruptions in schools or has the potential to do so.198 Yet
questions remain as to what actions constitute material and
substantial disruptions and what factors make such
disruptions reasonably foreseeable. At the same time,
questions persist regarding how much off-campus cyberspeech
reaches into school settings.
It is clear from the litigation to date that students may be
disciplined for off-campus student speech that causes a
material and substantial disruption in the school setting. Most
agree that the arm of school administrators cannot extend to
off-campus activities unless those activities reach and have a
detrimental effect on the operation of the school. Again, an
important issue raised in all four of the recent circuit court
cases on cyberspeech reviewed in this Article is what exactly
constitutes a substantial disruption. A corollary issue is the
extent to which off-campus cyberspeech can reasonably be
considered to have entered the school, particularly in an age
when cyberspeech can be so easily accessed on the school
premises via computers and other electronic devices.
Effective school administrators take actions to quell student
disruptions before they become substantial. Therefore,
administrators frequently take proactive disciplinary action
when they see the potential for disruption. As Judge Jordan
stated in a concurring opinion in Layshock,
Modern communications technology, for all its positive
applications, can be a potent tool for distraction and
fomenting disruption. Tinher allows school officials to
discipline students based on a reasonable forecast of

198.

Tinlwr

lJ.

fJes Moines Indep. Cmty. Seh. IJist .. :l9:l U.S. 50:l. fi09 (1969).
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substantial disruption, without waiting for the chaos to
actually hit the haJlways.199

Unfortunately, the actions of school administrators may be
second-guessed by the courts after the fact, imposing on them
the burden of showing that the disruptions were reasonably
foreseeable. As is often the case, when those actions are
examined weeks or months later, the potential for disruption
may seem less obvious than it did at the time of the incidents.
School administrators thus need to be given some latitude in
this regard. Courts must understand that they should not
substitute their judgment for that of school administrators
unless the administrators clearly overreacted.200
The cases reviewed in this Article provide a contrast. It is
unclear why the school board in Layshock abandoned its claims
that the student's false profile of the principal caused or had
the potential to cause a disruption. Certainly, as the trial court
found in its initial ruling, having to shut down the school's
computer network and cancel classes would be a substantial
disruption in today's schools where computer and Internet use
are important tools in the instructional process. In Layshock,
the disruption likely would have been greater but for the fact
that the incident occurred just prior to a school break. In J.S.,
the school board also conceded that the disruption to the school
was minimal, although, as the trial court noted, there was
some disruption.
More importantly, in both Layshock and JS., the Third
Circuit appears to have played down the potential damage the
fake profiles may have caused to the principals' reputations
and their abilities to continue to maintain order in their
schools. In JS., the court incredulously wrote that the fake
profile was "so outrageous that no one could have taken it
seriously .... "201 Judge Fisher's dissent responded that the
199. Layshock ex rei. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.:ld 205, 222 (:ld Cir.
2011) (.Jordan. Circuit .Justice, concurring).
200. See B(l. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley. 151l U.S.
17G. 201l (1982) (denying a sign language interpreter to a student with (lisabilities)
("We prl'viously have cautioned that courts lack t.he 'specialized knowledge and
experience' necessary to resolve 'persistent and difflcult questions of educational
policy"').
201. .J.S. ex rei. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist, 650 F.:ld 915, 921 (:ld Cir.
2(11).
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court essentially "allow[ cd] a student to target a school official
and his family with malicious and unfounded accusations about
their character in vulgar, obscene, and personal language.''202
Further, in both Layshoch and J.S., the court seems to have
ignored the fact that by targeting school officials, the students
reached into the school setting and had an impact on the school
environment. One can only wonder whether the judges would
have been as magnanimous had they been the subject of
similar postings.
In the two cases reviewed in this Article involving
cyberspeech targeting students, Kowalshi and D.J.M., the
Fourth and Eighth Circuits were quick to recognize that the
actions of the offenders had a detrimental effect on the
operation of the school. Oddly, in the two cases where school
administrators were subjects of the harassing student postings,
the Third Circuit was not convinced of their detrimental effect
on the educational environment in the schools. Conversely, the
Fourth and Eighth Circuits rightfully were cognizant of the
obligation of school personnel to act quickly when students
were being threatened, intimidated, harassed, or bullied. In
contrast, as stated above, the Third Circuit failed to recognize
that when school personnel are harassed or ridiculed by
students, especially in a vulgar and demeaning fashion as in
Layshoch and J.S., it can cause as much harm as when
students are the targets.
As Judge Fisher noted in his dissent in J.S., "rb]roadcasting
a personal attack against a school official and his family online
to the school community not only causes psychological harm to
the targeted individuals but also undermines the authority of
the school."2o:l Further, as Judge Fisher noted, allowing such
speech to go unpunished not only undermines principals'
authority, but "demonstrate[s] to the student body that this
form of speech is acceptable behavior-whether on or off
campus."204 It is reasonably foreseeable that under these
circumstances, other students may see that they also can
attack school personnel in the same manner without fear of
retribution.
202.
20:1.
201.

Id. at 911 (Fisher, Cirmit .Justice dissenting).
lei. at 911 .
fd. at 915.
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If school administrators are to fulfill their responsibilities to
maintain order and discipline in the schools and sustain proper
environments for learning, they must be given the latitude
necessary to do so. When administrators take disciplinary
actions to quell potential disruptions, the courts should not
second-guess them just because they succeeded in preventing
anticipated disruptions.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
As school boards and administrators face the new
challenges posed by evolving technology while continuing to
meet their obligations to maintain safe, orderly, and welldisciplined environments for learning, it is imperative that
they develop, implement, and, when necessary, revise policies
that address acceptable Internet use, as well as harassment
and bullying. With the widespread use of technology in all
aspects of students' lives, it is crucial to have policies in place
that cover both topics. Disciplinary sanctions are more likely to
be upheld when challenged if they were made pursuant to and
consistent with policies of which both students and their
parents were aware.
In Kowalski, the school administrators suspended the
student based on the school board's policy against harassment,
bullying, and intimidation. In its decision supporting the school
officials' action, the Fourth Circuit noted that this policy put
the student on notice that such behavior could be punished. In
developing and reviewing such policies, school officials should
consider the following recommendations.

A.

Policies in General

School boards should work with attorneys prior to
developing policies to make sure that they are consistent with
federal and state statutes, regulations, and case law.
At the beginning of each school year, students, parents, and
teachers should sign receipts acknowledging that they have
received copies of all policies. This can provide concrete proof
that students were put on notice that specified violations are
punishable.
All policies should make it clear that violations are
punishable and identify possible sanctions, including loss of

21
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privileges and suspenSIOns for more senous offenses.
Additionally, as reflected in some of the litigation discussed
earlier, school officials need to distinguish carefully between
violations that occur in school and those that take place off
campus so that policies are not struck down as vague and
overbroad. Based on mixed results to date, the debate over the
extent to which school officials can discipline students for
misbehavior that does not originate in school but has an effect
on the school is one that is likely to receive increased judicial
attention.
All policies should be reviewed annually, typically between
school years, not during or immediately after controversies.
Revising policies on a scheduled basis affords educators better
perspectives, and, in the event of litigation, provides evidence
that educators are doing their best to stay up-to-date in
maintaining safe, orderly schools while safeguarding the rights
of all in school communities in the face of rapid legal, social,
and technological changes.

B.

Acceptable Use Policies (AUPs)

Carefully written AUPs in school settings and on schoolowned computer systems should limit computer access Lo
legitimate academic, instructional, or administrative purposes.
AUPs should make it clear that anyone who refuses to sign
receipt acknowledgements or fails to comply with their
provisions may be denied access to district-owned technology
and to the Internet through that technology.
In devising AUPs, school boards must clarify the
educational missions of their schools and delineate how
accessing the Internet supports that mission. Thus, school
personnel should use their AUPs as instructional tools to teach
students about the positive uses of the Internet and technology
while warning about hazards that can come about as a result of
unrestricted use, such as contacting strangers or losing respect
for others by accessing pornography.
AUPs should be differentiated based on student age. In
other words, AUPs should take into consideration the maturity
level of the students who will be accessing the technology.205
20D.

For the way in which schools deal with the age of students see Karen
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To the extent that computers, hardware, and software are
purchased and maintained with board funds, AUPs should
contain clear and unequivocal language indicating that use of
technology can be restricted. By clarifying ownership issues,
school boards can maintain greater latitude in regulating
access to and use of equipment.
In regulating student use of district-owned technology
consistent with legitimate educational and administrative
purposes, AUPs should warn against visiting inappropriate
websites and transmitting materials such as viruses, jokes, and
the like.
J\UPs should address privacy and use limitations, such as
preventing students from using school computers for nonschool related purposes,
while clarifying reasonable
expectations of privacy, especially relating to the sending and
receiving of messages. As to privacy, AUPs should make it
clear that computers, or, more properly, their hard drives, are
subject to random checks for compliance, whether accessed in
school or from home computers that link into school servers.
This part of the policy should also warn users against seeking
unauthorized access to the files of others, especially in such
sensitive areas as student grades and personnel material,
while advising users not to share their passwords with anyone,
including friends. On a related privacy issue, AUPs should
remind educators that since anything they write on districtowned computers is subject to disclosure under state public
records law, they should not put anything in print that they
would not want the public to see.
AUPs should make it known that filtering software is in use
but that it is not foolproof. While educators have legitimate
rights and duties to limit access to locations such as
pornographic websites, they must recognize that although
software in this area has improved, it still has not reached the
same level of sophistication as the sites they seek to monitor.
Thus, as school boards consider using filtering packages, they
should bear in mind that there are three broad types of
programs, each of which suffers from varying losses of
Thomas, Tank/I'd Web for Kids, USA TODAY, May 9, 2002, at 1(1) (noting that school
off1cials start introducing policies for children based on their ages around such
groupings as 7-9, 10- 12, 1:1-15, 16-18).
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preCISIOn. The first kind typically lists objectionable sites.
Software of this type may be helpful, but as sites multiply can
rapidly become obsolete, requiring constant monitoring and
updating. The second type of filter ordinarily lists
inappropriate words and/or phrases. However, problems can
arise when students are, for example, blocked from obtaining
material on breast cancer if, as it typically is, "breast" is among
the words that are screened out. The third kind of software
rates material in a fashion similar to the way in which movies,
television programs, and video games are classified. One
difficulty here may be that ratings are based partly on the
subjective judgments of evaluators whose perspective may
differ from those of educators and parents. In response to
critics who may equate Internet filters with censorship, it is
important to note that the courts agree that educators have
discretion to direct the content of school activities "so long as
their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns."206 Since courts regularly defer to educators who
exercise their reasonable discretion in excluding magazines
from school libraries that, for example, glorify drug use,
violence, and/or pornography, to the extent that filters are tools
to assist officials in limiting student access of inappropriate
I nternet materials, the judiciary is unlikely to intervene.
C.

Policies Addressing Harassment, Bullying, and
Intimidation

All policies should:
Include clear definitions of harassment, bullying, and
intimidation since doing so puts students on notice as to the
types of behavior that will not be tolerated. These definitions
should
encompass
verbal,
written,
and
electronic
communications, as well as physical acts and gestures that
cause physical or emotional harm, damage a bully victim's
property, put a victim in fear of harm, create a hostile
environment, infringe on the rights of a victim, or create a
material and substantial disruption to the school environment.
Prohibit all forms of harassment, bullying, and intimidation
on the basis of an individual's race, ethnicity, religion, gender,
20().

Hazl'iwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier. 181 U.S.

2()O. 27:) (1988).
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sexual orientation, or disability.
Make it clear that they apply to activities that occur on
school grounds, property adjacent to schools grounds,207 and
school buses and at school-sponsored and school-related events
and activities (whether on or off school grounds), school bus
stops, etc.
Include statements covering harassment, bullying, or
intimidation of school personnel or students via the Internet,
technology, and electronic devices, whether or not the devices
used are owned, leased, or used by the school district. Such
statements should make it clear that students are not immune
from discipline just because they use their own devices to
harass, bully, or intimidate others.
Specify that off-campus behavior is punishable if it creates
a hostile environment at school for a bully victim, infringes on
the rights of a victim, or creates a material and substantial
disruption to the educational process or the operation of the
school. Care should be taken that this aspect of the policy is not
overly broad, but covers only areas in which the school has a
legitimate interest.
Include prOVISiOns for age-appropriate instruction on
bullying prevention at all grade levels.
Contain mandates that all staff report instances of
harassment,
bullying,
or intimidation to
designated
administrators either immediately or, if impossible, by the end
of the school day at the latest. By the same token, policies must
mandate that administrators thoroughly investigate all such
reports. Courts have been consistent in finding school
authorities liable for showing indifference by failing to properly
investigate and respond to incidents of harassment and
bullying.208
207. Statutes or ordinances preventing loitering on school grounds or in the
vicinity of school buildings are increasingly common. Courts uphold these kinds of
rules as long as they are not overly vague or restrictive. For such a caSl', see
Wieml'rslage ex reZ. Wiemerslage v. Maine Twp. High Sch. Dist. 207, 29 F.:ld 1119 (7th
Cir. Hl91) (affirming a dismissal in favor of school officials in Illinois where pawnts
and their son sued school officials claiming that his being disciplined for brl'aking an
anti-loitering rule did not violatl' his rights to free speech, assembly and (hw procl'SS as
unconstitutionally vague).
20H. See, e.g., Cebser v. Lago Visa lndep. Sch. Dist., 521 U.S. 271 (199H) (holding
that a school district can be held liable for damagl's when an appropriatl' person was
notitll'd of harassment and responded to tbat notice in a dl,lilwratdy inciifferl'nt
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Make it clear that incidents will be reported to law
enforcement authorities when there is evidence that a cnme
has been committed.

VIII. CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit cases on student cyberspeech
demonstrate the challenges courts face in addressing charges
that school officials have violated the First Amendment rights
of students. The cases from the Third Circuit provide a contrast
to those litigated in the Fourth and Eighth Circuits in the
manner in which the respective courts applied prior Supreme
Court jurisprudence to situations involving types of
cyberspeech. Initially, it may appear that the difference lies in
the fact that courts may not take harassment of school
personnel as seriously as they do harassment or threats
against students. However, a closer examination shows that
differences in the judicial outcomes are more dependent on
whether the courts interpret student cyberspeech as reaching
into the schools and how they gauge its potential to cause
disruption.
The intersection of the First Amendment and the Internet
has created new challenges for educaLors and courts in recent
years, especially considering technology's potential to develop
at a faster rate than the law. Accordingly, it may be several
years before school administrators are given concrete guidance
regarding the extent to which they may discipline students for
off-campus cyberspeech. Unfortunately, since the Supreme
Court denied certiorari in Layshock, J.S., and Kowalski, it
appears that the Court will not be providing clarity to this
complex issue in the next term.

manner).

